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The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 20011 is failing both in
theory and execution. NCLB has been called "the most sweeping re-
form of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act since it was en-
acted in 1965" and was intended to "redefine the federal role in K-12
education so it can be used to improve the academic achievement of all
American students."2 The stated purpose of NCLB is to "ensure that
all children have a fair, equal and significant opportunity to obtain a
high-quality education."3 Instead, NCLB is leading to increasing law-
suits between the states and the federal government, threatened
school closures, and the potential collapse of entire city public school
systems.
This Article takes a new approach to examining the failure of
NCLB. Much of the criticism of NCLB focuses on the Act's substan-
tive requirements. NCLB attempts to achieve its goals by requiring
states to adopt minimum proficiency levels for students in reading,
math, and science. The Act then requires states to develop tests to
assess student proficiency according to these standards.4 The Act also
directs states to adopt teacher preparation and training methods, stu-
dent curriculum, and student instructional materials designed to meet
the academic standards set by the state. 5 The Act professes to provide
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2000).
2. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., House-Senate Education Conference Report:
No Child Left Behind (Dec. 12, 2001), http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/
2001/12/12112001b.html.
3. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. III 2003).
4. Id. § 6301(1); Mark Littleton, High Stakes Testing, 187 EDUC. LAw REP. 389, 389
(2004) ("States are required to develop a system where state standards are al-
igned with and measured by a state-determined system of measurement. NCLB
does not require any exit exam, but it does require testing in reading and mathe-
matics at specific grade levels.").
5. Littleton, supra note 4, at 389; see also M. Hayes Mizell, From Muck to
Mountaintop, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 261, 271 (2004) (stating that NCLB insists that
school boards and principals devote resources to hiring teachers who are highly
knowledgeable in their subject areas).
Title II of NCLB is entitled "Preparing, Training, and Recruiting High Quality
Teachers and Principals." This portion of the Act gives grants to states and
school districts to hire well-qualified teachers and improve teacher training. This
portion requires states and school districts seeking these funds to assess the
needs of the teachers for professional development. Id. at 268. The teacher prep-
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"greater decisionmaking authority and flexibility to schools and teach-
ers in exchange for greater responsibility for student performance."6
Critics charge that these statutory provisions have many negative
consequences, including an overreliance on standardized testing, a
strain on state educational resources, and the further isolation of mi-
nority students and students with disabilities.
One aspect of NCLB that has been virtually ignored by its propo-
nents and critics is the day-to-day administration of the Act. NCLB is
administered by the Department of Education (DOE), and much of its
actual impact on schools and students will be determined based on the
regulations enacted by that agency.7 Congress has directed the DOE
to use negotiated rulemaking as the procedure for adopting all regula-
tions to implement the Act.8 This negotiated rulemaking procedure
used by the DOE will prominently figure into the implementation of
NCLB.
Negotiated rulemaking rose to prominence in the late 1980s and
early 1990s as an alternative to the traditional notice and comment
rulemaking procedure outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act.9
Negotiated rulemaking requires an agency to consult with interested
parties before giving notice of a proposed regulation.1O Negotiated
rulemaking has been championed as a means of decreasing the length
of rulemaking proceedings and avoiding subsequent litigation.11 The
agency attempts to build consensus among these interested parties
prior to issuing a proposed rule. For example, when used to enact en-
aration and training aspects of NCLB have become controversial and an issue of
dispute between school district's and teacher's unions. See Associated Press, No
Child Left Behind Central Contract Talk Issue, CNN ONLINE (Nov. 10, 2005) (on
file with author) (explaining that teachers on strike in Oregon seek job security
despite any penalties that may derive from the requirements of NCBL).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(7) (Supp. III 2003).
7. See, e.g., Nick Lewin, The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: The Triumph of
School Choice Over Racial Desegregation, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 95,
95 (2005) (arguing that DOE regulations under NCLB subjugate desegregation
orders to school choice and standards-based accountability).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b) (Supp. III 2003) (describing the negotiated rulemaking pro-
cess to be used under NCLB).
9. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Re-
sponse to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, 390-91 (2001) (tracing the
history of negotiated rulemaking).
10. See generally Steel Joist Inst. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 287 F.3d
1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding an OSHA regulation developed in a negotiated
rulemaking regarding safety standards for steel erection); Ass'n of Am. R.R. v.
Dep't of Transp., 198 F.3d 944, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that the Federal Rail-
road Administration established negotiated rulemaking committee to draft regu-
lations to protect railroad workers from injury); Ala. Power Co. v. USEPA, 40
F.3d 450, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that the Environmental Protection Agency
convened a failed negotiated rulemaking committee to enact a regulation inter-
preting a portion of the Clean Air Act).
11. See infra section III.A.
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vironmental regulations, a negotiated rulemaking committee will
bring together the Environmental Protection Agency, environmental-
ist groups, and industry interests in order to come to a consensus on a
proposed rule to implement an environmental statute. 12 In the con-
text of education, the interested parties likely to participate in NCLB
negotiated rulemakings with the DOE are representatives of state ed-
ucation agencies, local school board officials, school administrators,
teachers, parents, and students.
This Article argues that the substantive failures of NCLB are mag-
nified and exacerbated in the negotiated rulemaking process. Negoti-
ated rulemaking offers the promise of collaboration between the DOE,
state education officials, local school boards, teachers, parents, and
students to achieve the goals of NCLB. Instead, the voices of the non-
DOE officials are being ignored during the negotiated rulemaking pro-
cess. The valid critiques of many aspects of the Act, such as the bur-
dens on state resources, are left unaddressed during the rulemaking
process. Instead of the administrative process leading to the best
practices to achieve statutory goals, it becomes another roadblock to
success for NCLB.
Part I of this Article describes the major statutory provisions of
NCLB. These include the requirements that states set academic con-
tent standards for all grades, that states develop an assessment sys-
tem to measure students' progress towards meeting the adopted
academic standards, and finally the statutory requirement for schools
to make adequate yearly progress towards all students meeting the
designated proficiency standards. Part I also describes the dominant
substantive critiques of NCLB. Part II of this Article describes the
procedural requirements of NCLB, specifically the negotiated
rulemaking sessions undertaken by the DOE since 2002. Part III pro-
vides a detailed description of the history of negotiated rulemaking as
an administrative procedure. Part IV of this Article demonstrates the
connection between the substantive critiques of NCLB and the DOE's
failure in procedural execution. I argue that NCLB was intended to be
a partnership between the federal and state governments to benefit
the welfare of public schools. Instead, NCLB has created greater bu-
reaucracy for school systems and has increased conflict between states
and the federal government. I further contend that a significant bar-
rier to maximizing the potential benefits of NCLB is the silencing of
the interested stakeholders in the negotiated rulemaking process.
Part V proposes solutions to the procedural missteps of NCLB that are
intended to address the overall substantive goals of the Act.
12. See Coglianese, supra note 9, at 392 (stating that as of 1996, the EPA had com-
pleted twelve negotiated rulemakings).
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I. NCLB-A SUBSTANTIVE OVERVIEW
The legislation commonly known as the "No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001" is an amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965.13 The Act unfolds in many parts and focuses on a
wide variety of topics, including improving academic achievement, the
creation of charter schools, teacher training, and even the role of faith-
based groups in improvement of public education.14
The portion of NCLB that is the focus of this Article and of most of
the public attention is Title I of the Act, "Improving the Academic
Achievement of the Disadvantaged." The stated goal of this portion of
NCLB is to improve the academic performance of all public school chil-
dren. 15 Another goal of this portion is to "clos[e] the achievement gap
between high and low-performing children, especially the achieve-
ment gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers."16 To meet
this goal of improving student performance, NCLB requires states to
attend to three different areas: academic standards, assessments, and
accountability. 17
A. Academic Standards, Assessments, and Accountability
Under NCLB
1. Academic Standards
NCLB requires states to develop statewide academic content and
standards for all public schools and students.' 8 The academic stan-
13. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. III 2003) (explaining, in "Codification," that this Act
amended the "Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965").
14. See, e.g., id. § 6316(b)(1)(E) (allowing students from schools in need of "improve-
ment" to enroll in public charter schools); id. § 6319 (detailing the requirements
for teacher qualifications and training).
15. Id. § 6301 ("The purpose of this title is to ensure that all children have a fair,
equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach,
at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards
and state academic assessments.").
16. Id. § 6301(3). Although the Act in itself is federal legislation on education, Title I
specifically prohibits federal "control" over schools. "Nothing in this title shall be
construed to authorize an officer or employee of the Federal Government to man-
date, direct, or control a State, local educational agency, or school's specific in-
structional content, academic achievement standards and assessments,
curriculum, or program of instruction." Id. § 6575.
17. See id. § 6301(1) (stating that meeting the goal of high-quality education for all
students can be accomplished by "ensuring that high-quality academic assess-
ments, accountability systems, teacher preparation and training, curriculum, and
instructional materials are aligned with challenging State academic standards so
that students, teachers, parents, and administrators can measure progress
against common expectations for student academic achievement").
18. Id. § 6311(b). State educational agencies are required to submit a plan to the
DOE that describes the "challenging academic standards" adopted by the state.
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dards adopted by a state must apply to students and all schools in the
state. 19 The states were required to adopt these standards by the
2004-2005 school year for math and reading.20 By 2007, the states
must have developed academic content and standards in science. 2 1
NCLB describes "challenging academic standards" as standards
that (1) "specify what children are expected to know and be able to do";
(2) "contain coherent and rigorous content"; and (3) "encourage the
teaching of advanced skills."22 Once the state sets academic content,
the state should also set up three levels of achievement standards-
basic, proficient, and advanced-to determine how well children
master the academic content. 23 The Act gives states the option of de-
veloping academic standards for each grade or across several
grades. 24 Finally, NCLB requires each state to detail the body of
knowledge each student should have in reading and math at the time
of her high school graduation. 2 5
2. Assessments
In order to determine whether students are meeting the statewide
academic standards, each state must adopt "a set of high-quality,
yearly student academic assessments."26 The assessment system
should be "designed to be valid and accessible for use by the widest
possible range of students, including students with disabilities and
students with limited English proficiency." 27 The Act further requires
that, beginning in 2004-2005, testing be given every year to students
in reading and math. Testing for science began in 2007.28
NCLB sets up a series of requirements for the assessment method
chosen by the state. These requirements mandate (1) that the same
assessment system be used to measure all children; (2) that the as-
sessment system be aligned with the state academic content stan-
dards; (3) that the assessment be used for purposes that are valid and
reliable; and (4) that the state be able to provide evidence to the DOE
The statute instructs that these academic standards should be adopted by the
state educational agency in consultation with "local educational agencies, teach-
ers, principals, pupil services personnel, administrators." Id. § 6311(a)(1).
19. Id. § 6311(b)(1)(B).
20. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(F).
21. Id. § 6311(b)(1)(C).
22. Id. § 6311(b)(1)(D)(i).
23. Id. § 6311(b)(1)(D)(ii). The "basic" level of achievement is intended to provide
complete information about the progress of children who have not yet reached the
proficient level of achievement. Id.
24. See generally id. § 6311.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 6311(b)(3)(A). The assessments must include, at minimum, testing for
mathematics, reading, and science.
27. 34 C.F.R. § 200.2 (2006).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(A) (Supp. III 2003).
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from the test publisher or other relevant sources that the assessment
is of adequate technical quality.2 9
One of the unique aspects of the NCLB assessment requirements is
the data that states are expected to collect. States are instructed to
collect longitudinal data that links student test scores, length of en-
rollment, and graduation rates.3 0 States must also "produce individ-
ual student interpretive, descriptive, and diagnostic reports" that are
intended to inform parents, teachers, and administrators about each
child's particular academic needs. 3 1 Also, the assessment results
must be disaggregated within "each State, local educational agency,
and school by gender, by each major racial and ethnic group, by En-
glish proficiency status, by migrant status, by students with disabili-
ties as compared to nondisabled students, and by economically
disadvantaged students as compared to students who are not economi-
cally disadvantaged."3 2
3. Accountability
In the wake of the yearly testing, NCLB requires states to hold
schools and school districts accountable for student performance. 33
The benchmark for the NCLB accountability system is adequate
yearly progress (AYP).34 The ultimate statutory goal is for all stu-
dents in the state to reach proficiency in reading, math, and science in
twelve years.3 5 The states must determine the yearly progress that
should be made towards this goal.3 6 Each state must define what con-
stitutes the AYP of the state, and all public elementary and secondary
schools are evaluated according to whether they meet the AYP.37
The definition of AYP must include a separate annual objective for
continuous and substantial improvement for students who are eco-
29. Id. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(i)-(iv).
30. Id. § 6311(b)(3)(B).
31. Id, § 6311(b)(3)(C)(xii).
32. Id. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(xiii).
33. Id. § 6311(b)(2).
34. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(A) ("Each State plan shall demonstrate that the State has devel-
oped and is implementing a single, statewide State accountability system that
will be effective in ensuring that all local educational agencies, public elementary
schools, and public secondary schools make adequate yearly progress as defined
under this paragraph.").
35. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(F).
36. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B). The statute defines AYP as a standard that (1) applies high
standards of academic achievement to all public elementary and secondary
schools in the state; (2) is statistically valid and reliable; (3) results in substan-
tial academic improvement for all students; (4) includes annual objectives for aca-
demic improvement; and (5) includes separate measurable annual objectives for
academic improvement and achievement for minority students, disabled stu-
dents, and economically disadvantaged students. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C).
37. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B).
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nomically disadvantaged, as well as those in major racial and ethnic
groups. 38 Ninety-five percent of students in a racial or ethnic minor-
ity group or disability subgroup must take the assessment in order for
a school to reach AYP. 3 9 However, in order for the school to actually
count these subgroup scores, the number of students in the subgroup
must be sufficient to provide statistically reliable results in order for
the ninety-five percent requirement to affect AYP.40
If a school fails to meet the state goals for AYP, it should be identi-
fied for "improvement, corrective action, or restructuring."41 Parents
must be informed if the school fails to meet AYP.42 Any school that
fails to make adequate yearly progress for two or more consecutive
years is designated as in need of "improvement."43 This designation
allows parents the option to transfer their child to another public
school, and the ability to receive funds for supplemental educational
services. 4 4 The option of transferring also allows parents to choose a
public charter school.4 5 Priority for transfer is given to "the lowest
achieving children from low-income families."46
A school is designated as in need of "corrective action" if it fails to
make AYP for two additional years after an "improvement" designa-
tion. 47 Beyond allowing school transfer and supplemental education
services, a "corrective action" designation also calls for replacement of
school staff, implementation of a new curriculum, and decreased man-
agement authority at the school level.48
If after one school year of corrective action a school still fails to
achieve AYP, the school is designated as in need of "restructuring."49
Thus, after five years of failed AYP, a school is designated for restruc-
turing. As of 2006, almost 2,000 schools were given the "restructur-
ing" designation after failing to meet the AYP requirements for five
consecutive years. 50 This number may reach as many as 10,000
38. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C).
39, Id. § 6311(b)(2)(I)(ii).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 6316(a).
42. Id. § 6316(b)(6). Parents must be informed if a school is designated as in need of
improvement, corrective action, or restructuring. The notice must include an ex-
planation of the designation, reason for identification, and an explanation of a
plan of improvement. Id.
43. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(A).
44. Id. § 6316(b)(1); see also GAIL SUNDERMAN ET AL., NCLB MEETS SCHOOL REALI-
TIES: LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 39-56 (2005).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
46. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(ii).
47. Id. § 6316(b)(7)(C).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 6316(b)(8).
50. Associated Press, Rising Number of Schools Face Serious Penalties, CNN ONLINE
(May 10, 2006) (on file with author).
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schools in the next five years.5 1 A "restructuring" designation opens
the school to a variety of options including state takeover, mass staff
firings, reopening the school as a charter school, and even school
closure. 52
B. Dominant Substantive Critiques of NCLB
NCLB appears to have an uncontroversial legislative agenda: im-
proving education for all students. However, there has been a wide-
spread discussion by federal and state legislators, education policy
experts, legal experts, and the public about the Act's benefits and
drawbacks. 53 These debates have focused on several of the prominent
substantive features of NCLB, including the stress on state resources
to comply with the Act, the proliferation of and dependence on high-
stakes testing, the effect on minority children and special education
students, and the possible link to privatization of public schools. 5 4
51. Id. In some cities and states the number of schools "failing" under NCLB is
reaching crisis level. For example, one-third of Chicago's public schools will un-
dergo restructuring under NCLB. Kate N. Grossman, 185 Failing Schools to Un-
dergo $5 Mil. in Changes, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, May 22, 2006, at 26; Karen
Francisco, Inadequate Yearly Help: State Lacks Resources to Help Schools That
Miss No Child Left Behind Targets, May 21, 2006 (on file with author) (reporting
that one-half of the state's schools fail to meet AYP and the state may be forced to
move toward a charter school system to meet the requirements of NCLB).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Mizell, supra note 5, at 261 (stating that some see NCLB as being a tool
to reshape America's schools while others consider it impractical and counter-
productive); Michael Winerip, On Education: A Failure of Logic and Logistics,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2003, at B8 (stating that NCLB "may go down as the most
unpopular piece of education legislation ever created"); National Education Asso-
ciation, Growing Chorus of Voices Calling for Changes in No Child Left Behind,
http://www.nea.org/esea/chorusl.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) (stating the Na-
tional Education Association supports the goals of NCLB but wants the Act to
look for alternative ways to measure student achievement and remedies for un-
derperforming schools).
54. Sarah D. Greenberg, Enforceable Rights, No Child Left Behind, and Political Pa-
triotism: A Case for Open-Minded Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1011, 1013 (2005) (examining the rights of parents and other aggrieved parties to
bring suit against states under § 1983 to hold states accountable for implement-
ing program that meet the requirements of NCLB); Matthew R. Plain, Results
Above Rights? The No Child Left Behind Act's Insidious Effect on Students with
Disabilities, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 249, 250 (2004) (concluding that the
goals of NCLB are adverse to the directives of the Individual with Disabilities
Education Act).
This Article does not address the validity of each of these criticisms. Instead I
seek to identify the critiques of NCLB, and demonstrate how these criticisms are
affected by the administrative procedure employed by the DOE.
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1. NCLB Burdens on State Resources
The critique of NCLB that has generated the most formal legal ac-
tion is the argument that Congress is not providing sufficient mone-
tary resources to the states to meet the statutory requirements. There
have been several major lawsuits filed by states to challenge the Act
on this basis.5 5 In 2005, Connecticut filed a lawsuit against the DOE
55. School District of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. Civ.A. 05-CV-71535-D, 2005 WL
3149545 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005), was filed on April 20, 2005, against the DOE
by the National Education Association (NEA) and joined by school districts in
Michigan, Texas, Vermont, and ten other NEA affiliated teachers associations.
Id. at *1. The NEA argued that NCLB is costing districts more than money than
they are receiving in federal funding. Id. This lawsuit is a direct challenge to the
enforcement of NCLB's accountability standards.
More specifically, the claim asserts that state and local school districts are
illegally being required to cover unfunded mandates as set forth by the Act. Id.
The provision of NCLB in question raised by the NEA would appear to excuse
states from having to cover any requirement under NCLB that is not fully funded
by the federal government. The unfunded mandate provision, section 9527(a) of
NCLB, states, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize an officer or
employee of the federal government to mandate . . . a state or any subdivision
thereof to spend any funds or incur any costs not paid for under this Act." 20
U.S.C. § 7907(a) (Supp. III 2003). The plaintiffs request that the government ex-
empt school districts from any of the law's requirements that are not paid. The
lawsuit also asks that the federal government be further prohibited from with-
holding funds if a state refuses to comply with the accountability standards that
require a state to spend its own revenue to meet such standards. The lawsuit
alleges that NCLB imposes requirements on state and school districts that were
not paid for by the federal government. Spellings, 2005 WL 3149545, at *2.
The government filed a motion to dismiss on the argument that the plaintiffs
lacked sufficient legal standing to bring the lawsuit. The government's motion to
dismiss was granted on November 23, 2005. The district court judge stated that
"if the lawmakers had meant to pay for mandates in the law, they would have
phrased the legislation to say so clearly and unambiguously." Id. at *4.
As of March 22, 2006, the case is currently on appeal by the NEA and other
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claim that legislative history supports their interpreta-
tion of section 9527(a), the section that prohibits unfunded mandates.
The most recent lawsuit attacking the legality of certain provisions of NCLB
was originally filed by Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal on Au-
gust 22, 2005. See First Amended Complaint, Connecticut v. Spellings, No.
3:05cv1330 (D. Conn. Mar. 2, 2006) (on file with author). In a show of support for
Connecticut's lawsuit, the District of Columbia and Connecticut, Delaware, Illi-
nois, Maine, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin have all also filed an amicus brief with
the Sixth Circuit on the legal interpretation of the Unfunded Mandates Provi-
sion, 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (Supp. III 2003), of NCLB. Blumenthal alleges that the
U.S. Secretary of Education, Margaret Spellings, is in effect illegally imposing
more than $50 million in unfunded federal mandates on Connecticut under
NCLB. The lawsuit alleges that the federal government has repeatedly refused
to grant the state waivers or full funding to comply with NCLB-violating the
express terms of the Act and the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution. First
Amended Complaint, supra, at 3.
The State of Connecticut argues that NCLB prohibits the federal government
from forcing the state to pay for any costs associated with complying with NCLB
[Vol. 85:i0151024
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alleging that NCLB unlawfully requires states to use more resources
for student testing than are being provided by the federal
government. 56
Another aspect of this argument is that NCLB is infringing on a
realm of regulation that is traditionally left to the states. Although
Title I has provided federal funds to local schools for almost forty
years, NCLB represents a significant expansion of federal influence in
an area typically left to the states. Many observers point to the fact
that before NCLB most states already had their own mechanisms for
setting academic proficiency standards and using testing to assess
student achievement. In fact, all fifty states had accountability sys-
tems prior to the passage of NCLB.57 Most states have had these ac-
countability systems since the mid-1980s, and the Clinton
Administration began requiring accountability plans under Title I in
1994.58 The process of implementing NCLB has meant that many
states are expending resources adopting academic standards and in-
("Unfunded Mandates Provision"). Id. at 4. The state further alleges that the
Spending Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, permits Congress to place conditions on
the receipt of federal funds given compliance with certain obligations, provided
that the conditions are clearly and unambiguously defined in the Act. Id. Con-
necticut claims that the shortfall in federal funding to comply with NCLB will
cost the state more than $50 million.
According to the Connecticut Attorney General's press release, the lawsuit's
goals are to have the court:
" declare that the state and its local school districts are not required to
spend state, local or non-NCLB funds to comply with NCLB mandates;
" declare that the federal government cannot withhold federal funds, bene-
fits, or decline to grant waivers to the state for failing to comply with the
NCLB Act due to insufficient federal funding;
" enjoin the federal government from mandating, directing or controlling the
allocation of state or local resources;
* prohibit the federal government from taking any adverse action against
the state because of failure to comply with NCLB which is attributable to
the state's refusal to spend its own funds to comply; [and]
" grant Connecticut's waiver requests and award the state any costs, fees
and other expenses incurred prosecuting this lawsuit.
See Press Release, Conn. Att'y Gen.'s Office, State Sues Federal Government over
Illegal Unfunded Mandates Under No Child Left Behind Act (Aug. 22, 2005),
http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=1949&Q=300456&pp=12&n=l.
56. See Press Release, Conn. Att'y Gen.'s Office, supra note 55 (stating that Connecti-
cut filed suit against the DOE alleging violations of NCLB and the Spending
Clause of the U.S. Constitution for failing to grant waivers or provide full funding
for compliance with NCLB).
Various school districts from Michigan, Texas, and Vermont have also filed a
joint lawsuit against the DOE for requiring states and school districts to comply
with NCLB without providing the necessary funds. The lawsuit seeks a declara-
tory judgment and injunctive relief to prevent the DOE from enforcing unfunded
provisions of the Act. See Spelling, 2005 WL 314954, at *1.
57. SUNDERMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 23-38.
58. Id.
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stituting new assessment measures when they already had accounta-
bility mechanisms in place.5 9 One educational policy expert has
noted:
In building accountability systems that complied with the requirements in
NCLB, states layered the federal requirements on top of existing systems.
Many policymakers decided to retain their own accountability systems in ad-
dition to adopting plans that complied with NCLB. This allowed states to
keep educational goals they felt were important, maintain broad-based sup-
port for the state system, and, at the same time, satisfy the federal goals.
Nonetheless, it created fragmented systems where schools often had to meet
two sets of performance measures-one for the state and one to meet the fed-
eral law's AYP goals.
6 0
The tension between the federal legislative goals of NCLB and the ex-
isting state accountability systems places a strain on state resources
and represents an incoherent educational policy agenda.
2. NCLB as Testocracy
Another critique of the NCLB that is gaining increasing momen-
tum is the argument that NCLB creates overreliance on standardized
testing that actually jeopardizes the educational progress of students.
Some critics maintain that there has not been enough study of the
assessments being administered to determine that the tests are valid
and reliable.61
Furthermore, other observers argue that the high-stakes nature of
the testing changes the educational environment. The basic proposi-
tion is that because test scores in math and reading are the sole stan-
59. See id. In a few states the added consequences of NCLB may cause states to
lower academic standards already in place to insure schools are not labeled as
"failing" under NCLB. See Carrie Sturrock, States Distort School Test Scores,
Researchers Say: Critics Say California Among Those That Lower Standards for
No Child Left Behind, SAN FRANcisco CHRON., June 30, 2006, at A4; see also
Bruce Fuller et al., Is The No Child Left Behind Act Working? The Reliability of
How States Track Achievement (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Policy Analysis for Cal.
Educ., Working Paper No. 06-1, 2006), available at http://pace.berkeley.edu/
NCLB/WP06-01 Web.pdf (examining twelve state testing systems and conclud-
ing that state test results exaggerate improvement, and NCLB has the unin-
tended incentive of encouraging states to lower proficiency standards).
60. SUNDERMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 26-27. The State of Connecticut argues in
its lawsuit against the DOE that its "state-wide mastery examination" had been
successful, and that requiring additional measures of student achievement is un-
necessary. First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 3.
61. See generally Benjamin Michael Superfine, At the Intersection of Law and Psycho-
metrics: Explaining the Validity Clause of No Child Left Behind, 33 J.L. & EDUC.
475, 476-77 (2004) (explaining that the consequences of high-stakes testing
under NCLB should result in states taking special care to ensure that testing
practices are valid as defined under the Act); David Nash, Improving No Child
Left Behind: Achieving Excellence and Equity in Partnership with the States, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 239, 241 (2002) (arguing that NCLB is flawed because it relies
on the ability of states to develop rigorous and valid assessment instruments).
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dards for measuring AYP, the incentive for school administrators and
teachers is to concentrate on mastering only the body of knowledge
that will be tested.62 This may be done to the exclusion of, or decrease
in, emphasis on nontested subjects such as social studies, music, art,
and foreign languages. Even in the areas of reading and math, some
groups insist that "teaching to the test" may harm emphasis on
broader, critical-thinking skills.63
The negative impact on teachers under NCLB has also been docu-
mented. 6 4 "Teachers and their organizations, and people who do re-
search on teachers, were not actively involved in the writing of NCLB
and often seem to be the target of the Act."65 Teachers in schools that
do not meet AYP and are labeled as in need of improvement may face
sanctions. Under NCLB, teacher compensation and promotion may be
tied to testing results.66 Surveys of teachers demonstrate that the
majority of teachers disagree with the premise that sanctions will as-
sist them in improving student achievement levels.67 Studies demon-
62. See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 934 (2004). Ryan's article provides a fascinating perspective
on what he believes are the incentives created by NCLB. Ryan praises the goals
of the Act, but argues that NCLB is at war with itself. Ryan points to three areas
where NCLB creates incentives that work against the goals of the Act. Ryan
argues that the academic standards requirements of NCLB actually encourage
states to lower standards in order that they might be met. Also, the Act may
increase segregation by race and class making it more difficult for these students
to catch up to their wealthier peers. Finally, the NCLB's demand for high-quality
teachers may deter some talented people from wanting to enter teaching. Id.
63. One survey of teachers demonstrates that the NCLB accountability system influ-
ences the instructional and curricular practices of teachers. In one school dis-
trict, forty-six percent of teachers in improvement schools agreed that AYP
requirements caused them to deemphasize or neglect untested topics. SUN-
DERMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 91.
64. NCLB requires school systems to use "highly qualified" teachers. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 6319 (Supp. 1II 2003). The requirement for highly qualified teachers has af-
fected teachers in many states. See, e.g., V. Dion Hayes, 370 Uncertified Teachers
Will Be Fired; 450 at Risk, WASH. POST, June 25, 2006, at C7 (reporting that
hundreds of teachers will be fired due to failure to produce proof of their certifica-
tion); Feds Won't Sanction Alaska over Teacher Qualifications, SITNEws, June 24,
2006, http://www.sitnews.us/O606news/062406/062406-educ-sanctions.html (not-
ing that DOE threatened to place conditions on a federal grant due to Alaska's
failure to meet the "highly qualified" teacher requirement); Associated Press, Test
Required for New Iowa Teachers, Sioux CiTY J., http://www.siouxcityjournal.com/
articles/2006/06/18/news/iowa/0e42df79526e7442862571910007ad23.txt (last vis-
ited May 7, 2007) (reporting that new elementary school teachers will have to
take a test for certification to meet the NCLB requirements); Callie Clark Miller,
Federal Deadline on Teacher Certification Coming Next Month, SOUTHEAST MIS-
SOURIAN, June 12, 2006, at 1A (stating that very few Missouri school districts
have met the federal requirement of having "highly qualified" teachers).
65. SUNDERMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at xxxii.
66. See id.
67. See id. A survey of teachers in Vermont reported that eighty-three percent of all
teachers believed that NCLB mandates were ineffective and had a detrimental
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strate that teachers believe that "effective teachers, committed
administrators, and sufficient resources in the form of instructional
and curriculum materials are also needed for improving schools."68
3. Impact on Minority and Disabled Students
An additional complication of NCLB is the effect of the additional
assessments and accountability regime on groups of vulnerable stu-
dents, such as minority and disabled students. Ironically, NCLB sets
a special legislative agenda to improve the educational performance of
these students. The potential and actual impact of NCLB on minority
and disabled students is a complicated story that deserves in-depth
analysis and consideration. This subsection only seeks to provide a
brief overview of the controversy.
The critique of NCLB in regards to minority and disabled students
is multifaceted.69 First, some observers argue that NCLB has a large
loophole allowing schools to exclude minority students from calcula-
tions of AYP.70 The Act and DOE regulations require that the number
of any minority subgroup taking the assessment be large enough to
reliably measure the results.71 Many schools have asked for exemp-
tions to exclude minority students from being counted in their school
results due to an insufficient sample. 7 2 In 2005-2006, the test scores
of nearly two million students were not counted in the AYP calcula-
tions, and most of these were minority students.73 The DOE claims
that it is attempting to close this loophole in the Act.74 Some observ-
ers argue that the exemption creates perverse incentives, such as at-
effect on Vermont schools. Alis Headlam, No Child Law Hinders Education, Rur-
LAND HERALD, June 15, 2006, http://www.rutlandhearld.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article
?AID=/20060615/NEWS/606150310/1039&template.
68. SUNDERMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 87.
69. See generally Lewin, supra note 7, at 95 (arguing that DOE regulations under
NCLB "subjugate desegregation to school choice and standards-based
accountability").
70. See Ryan, supra note 62, at 962.
71. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(I)(ii) (Supp. III 2003) ("[Nlot less than 95 percent of each
group of students . . . who are enrolled in the school are required to take the
assessments ... on which adequate yearly progress is based (except that the 95
percent requirement described in this clause) shall not apply in a case in which
the number of students in a category is insufficient to yield statistically reliable
information or the results would reveal personally identifiable information about
an individual student.").
72. See, e.g., Meghan E. Moravcik, English-Learner Test Scores May Imperil Schools,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 10, 2006, at Al (stating that state education officials battle
to exclude test scores of students not yet proficient in English in order to avoid
having 100 schools labeled as "failing" under NCLB).
73. Associated Press, supra note 50.
74. Ben Feller & Frank Bass, Spellings to Examine 'No Child' Loophole, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 21, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/education/k_12/articles/2006/
04/21/spellingsto_examineno childloophole/.
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tempts to maintain small numbers of minority and disabled students
in a school to continue to qualify for this exemption. 7 5
In contrast, the DOE and some civil rights advocates argue that
the school transfer option may help to integrate students from schools
with greater numbers of low-income and minority students into
schools with higher achievement levels.76 The basic theory is that if
low-performing schools are schools that have high concentrations of
minority and poor students, the transfer option will allow these stu-
dents to move to schools with higher achievement levels. This would
make the schools with higher achievement levels more racially inte-
grated. However, the data collected on the school transfer option dem-
onstrates that a very small number of students are taking advantage
of the transfer option.7 7
Some observers have also pointed out the possible effect NCLB
may have on the already complicated landscape of desegregation
cases. The school-choice provisions of NCLB may throw off the racial
balance achieved under the student assignment aspects of a school
district's desegregation plan.78 This concern is exacerbated because
the DOE has informed some school districts that they should follow
the NCLB school-choice provision even when doing so conflicts with
desegregation orders.79 The DOE has also advised school districts fac-
ing this problem to seek to have desegregation orders lifted.80
The statutory language and regulations of NCLB also attempt to
consider the implications for students covered by the Individuals with
75. See Ryan, supra note 62, at 961-62.
76. SUNDERMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 40; see also Daniel J. Losen, Challenging
Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act's
Race-Conscious Accountability, 47 How. L.J. 243, 246 (2004) (arguing that
NCLB's race-conscious accountability measures have the potential to give civil
rights advocates the tools to hold schools accountable for failures in the education
of minority and socioeconomically disadvantaged students).
77. The Harvard Civil Rights Project examined the school transfer policy in ten
school districts that began implementation of the option in 2002-2003. Their
study showed that only three percent of the eligible students requested transfers.
The Council of Great City Schools study from 2003-2004 shows that nationwide
only two percent of the eligible students requested transfers. SUNDERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 44, at 44-45.
78. See Lewin, supra note 7, at 96 (pointing out that the DOE regulations require
school districts to place school choice provisions above their desegregation plans);
Cathryn Vaughn, Note, The School Choice Provision of the No Child Left Behind
Act and Its Conflict with Desegregation Orders, 13 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 79 (2003).
79. Vaughn, supra note 78, at 85-86. Vaughn gives the example of the Richmond
County, Georgia, school district where the district asked to be exempted from the
NCLB school-choice provisions in order to comply with its desegregation plan.
The DOE informed the school district that they were not exempt from the Act,
and advised them to have their desegregation order lifted. Id.
80. Id.
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Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Some critics argue that the goals
of NCLB are inherently at odds with the IDEA.81
II. PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW OF NCLB
The previous Parts provided an overview of the substantive re-
quirements of NCLB and the critiques of the Act by various interest
groups. This Part begins to provide an overview of an area of NCLB
that has been virtually ignored-the procedural aspects of implement-
ing the Act. Title I of NCLB gives broad rulemaking authority to the
Secretary of Education. "The Secretary may issue such regulations as
are necessary to reasonably ensure that there is compliance with this
subchapter."8 2 Under Title I, in order to adopt rules to implement the
Act, the agency must engage in negotiated rulemaking. The negoti-
ated rulemaking procedure under the Act first requires "the Secretary
[to] obtain the advice and recommendations of representatives of Fed-
eral, State, and local administrators, parents, teachers, paraprofes-
sionals, and members of local school boards and other organizations
involved with the implementation and operation of programs under
this subchapter."8 3
After the agency receives the recommendations, it begins the nego-
tiated rulemaking process by appointing a group to participate in the
negotiations. 84 The agency should appoint representatives to partici-
81. Matthew R. Plain, Comment, Results Above Rights? The No Child Left Behind
Act's Insidious Effect on Students with Disabilities, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 249, 250 (2004) (concluding that the goals of NCLB are adverse to the direc-
tives of the Individual with Disabilities Education Act).
The Ottawa, Illinois, school districts sought to have a federal court declare
two sections of NCLB invalid because complying with such provisions would re-
quire the districts to violate the IDEA. See Order on Motion to Dismiss, Bd. of
Educ. of Ottawa Twp. High Sch. Dist. 140 v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 5C655 (N.D.
Ill. July 20, 2005) (on file with author).
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment invalidating provisions of NCLB
that require the school districts to employ systemic remediation activities that
necessitate the modification of students' individualized education programs
(IEPs) without regard to the individual needs of the students. The judge dis-
missed the complaint because the districts failed to establish a "sufficient level of
injury" to meet the constitutional standing requirements. The district court
found that because NCLB does not mandate any specific action, the school dis-
tricts are not required to do anything that would necessarily violate the IDEA.
Since the suit was dismissed for lack of standing, the court did not reach the
defendant's arguments that the suit should be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
82. 20 U.S.C. § 6571(a) (Supp. III 2003).
83. Id. § 6571(b)(1).
84. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1901(b)(3)(B), 115
Stat. 1425, 1617 (2002). Before the agency may publish proposed rules under
NCLB, the agency was required to establish a negotiated rulemaking process to
address standards and assessments for NCLB; select the group to participate in
the negotiated rulemaking process from the group that provided advice and rec-
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pate in the process from among the individuals or groups that pro-
vided recommendations and advice.8 5 The Act states that there
should be "representation from all geographic regions of the United
States, in such numbers as will provide an equitable balance between
representatives of parents and students and representatives of educa-
tors and education officials."8 6
The negotiated rulemaking requirement of NCLB is relatively
novel in that it is required in every rulemaking under Title I of the
Act.87 Negotiated rulemaking has traditionally been an option for an
agency to adopt after deciding that the rulemaking fits certain crite-
ria.8 8 Under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, before institut-
ing a negotiated rulemaking process, the agency should find that
"there are a limited number of identifiable interests that will be signif-
icantly affected by the rule."8 9 NCLB skips this step in the process by
requiring negotiated rulemaking in all circumstances in which the
DOE is proposing a new regulation.
A. Negotiated Rulemaking Under NCLB
Soon after NCLB became law, the DOE began the major rulemak-
ing required under Title I of the Act. The DOE's first proposed regula-
tions were intended to implement the statutory requirements related
ommendations; and prepare a draft of the policy options to be presented to the
negotiated rulemaking group.
85. See id.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. "Before publishing in the Federal Register proposed regulations to carry out this
title, the Secretary shall obtain the advice and recommendations of representa-
tives of Federal, State, and local administrators, parents, teachers, paraprofes-
sionals, and members of local school boards and other organizations involved
with the implementation and operation of programs under this title." No Child
Left Behind Act § 1901(b)(1), 115 Stat. at 1617 (emphasis added).
NCLB is not the DOE's first foray into negotiated rulemaking. Prior to the
passage of NCLB, the DOE promulgated six rules as a result of negotiated
rulemaking. Coglianese, supra note 9, at 447 n.29.
In a few other statutes Congress has required an agency to engage in negoti-
ated rulemaking in order to promulgate regulations under a statute. See, e.g.,
USA Group Loan Serv. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
Higher Education Act was amended in 1992 to require the DOE to conduct a
negotiated rulemaking on the liability of loan service providers); Quality Care
Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1097 (W.D. Tenn.
2002) (noting that the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 amended Social Security Act
to require a new fee schedule set through negotiated rulemaking).
88. See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a) (Supp. III 2003) ("An agency may establish a negotiated
rulemaking committee .. "); Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d
313, 327 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that the plain language of the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 1990 indicates that its procedures are not mandatory).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(2) (Supp. III 2003).
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to academic standards and assessments. 90 The DOE issued a notice
seeking advice and recommendations on the proposed regulations
from "Federal, State, and local administrators; parents; teachers;
paraprofessionals; members of local boards of education; and other or-
ganizations involved with the implementation and operation of Title
I."91 Over one hundred parties submitted recommendations to the
DOE.92 From this group of participants, the DOE selected the persons
and organizations that would participate on the negotiated rulemak-
ing committee. 9 3 The rulemaking committee was made up of two
DOE officials and twenty-two other individuals from the groups of
school administrators, parents, teachers, and other organizations.
The DOE also conducted focus groups in four cities. 94 The first negoti-
ated rulemaking focused on the same three areas as the statutory lan-
guage in Title I of NCLB: academic standards, student assessments,
and accountability.
1. Standards
The proposed regulations repeat statutory language that all states
must "develop academic content and student academic achievement
standards for all schools and all [students]."95 The regulations allow
flexibility for states to develop content standards that cover each
grade, or content over several grades. 9 6 The regulations further state
that high school standards should reflect what students should know
at graduation in math, reading/language arts, and science, rather
than content linked to course names. 97 This must have been done in
math and reading by 2005-2006.
2. Assessments
The regulations incorporate the statutory requirement that each
state "implement a system of high-quality, yearly student academic
assessments."98 The regulations specify that the assessment system
should be "designed to be valid and accessible for use with the widest
possible range of students, including students with disabilities and
students with limited English proficiency."9 9 They also incorporate
the "statutory language requiring a State's assessment system to be
90. Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged, 67 Fed. Reg. 30,452
(proposed May 6, 2002) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 200).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 30,453.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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supported by evidence provided by test publishers or other relevant
sources."1 00
The regulations also provide more detailed instructions for states
on the collection and use of assessment data. For the purpose of disag-
gregating assessment data, students with disabilities are defined by
the IDEA.101 The regulations make clear that the Act's "requirement
to test only objective knowledge does not prohibit essay responses and
opinion questions."102 "[A] State may use different types of assess-
ments as long as each test (for grade and subject) fully addresses the
depth and breadth of the State's academic content standards; is valid,
reliable and of high technical quality . . . "103
As discussed in more detail in the next Part of this Article, the
negotiated rulemaking process also yielded regulation concerning how
a state's data should be measured against student assessment data
from other states. The regulations adopted require that if a state uses
assessments referenced against national norms at a particular grade,
the assessments should be augmented to accurately measure the
depth and breadth of the state's academic content and allow for re-
sults to be measured in terms of the state's academic levels.104 The
regulations allow a state to use both state and local assessments if the
design is rational and measures state academic content.10 5
The regulations also reiterate the statutory timeline for implemen-
tation of assessments. States must have implemented yearly assess-
ments in math and reading/language arts in grades three through
eight, and an assessment once during grades through twelve by
2005-2006.1o6 The assessment system must include all students and
provide accommodations for students with disabilities.107 There must
be one or more alternate assessments for students with disabilities.l08
Also, assessments must be made for students with limited English
proficiency in a "valid and reliable manner."1 0 9
3. Accountability
The regulations also include an exception that has become the
source of controversy with respect to the gathering of assessment data
about minority students. The regulations state that in determining
AYP, the state is responsible for determining how many students con-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 30,454.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 30,455.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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stitute a sufficient number to make results reliable.11o The results
must be disaggregated by gender, race, major racial and ethnic
groups, students with disabilities, and limited English proficiency.ll
B. Adequate Yearly Progress
The NCLB regulations incorporate the requirement that each state
must implement a single, statewide accountability system to ensure
that all public schools make AYP.112 Each state must define what
constitutes AYP for the state and for all public elementary and secon-
dary schools to ensure that each school meets the academic achieve-
ment standards. The definition of AYP must include a separate
annual objective for continuous and substantial improvement for eco-
nomically disadvantaged students, as well as those in major racial and
ethnic groups. 113
The regulations repeat the statutory language that a state should
identify schools that do not make AYP for "improvement, corrective
action, or restructuring."'14 After an "improvement" designation, a
school that does not make AYP for two additional years should be
identified as in need of "corrective action" and offer public school
choice and supplemental educational services to students enrolled.1 15
It is important to explain in detail the regulations that were the
outcome of the first negotiated rulemaking, primarily to demonstrate
their similarity with the statutory language of NCLB that was ex-
plained in the previous Part. The similarity between the regulations
and the statutory language is the first indication of the startlingly
close connection between the substance of NCLB and the way it is af-
fected by the negotiated rulemaking process.
Several important points emerge from this first series of regula-
tions. First, there seems to be a concerted effort by the DOE to paint
the negotiated rulemaking process as "nonregulatory." In other
words, the agency claims that its purpose is not to use regulation to
provide additional detail to the general statutory provisions, but only
to explain the statutory provisions as they are. As set forth in the
preamble to the proposed regulations,
It]he Secretary intends to regulate only if absolutely necessary. Rather than
regulating extensively, the Secretary intends to issue non-regulatory guidance
addressing particular legal and policy issues under Title I programs .... This
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged, 67 Fed. Reg. 50,986,
50,987 (proposed Aug. 6, 2002) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 200). There must
be guidelines for identifying the students with disabilities who should take alter-
native assessments, and those numbers should be reported. Id.
113. Id. at 50,986.
114. Id. at 50,989.
115. Id.
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guidance will inform schools, parents, school districts, States, and other af-
fected parties about the flexibility that exists under the statute, including dif-
ferent approaches they may take to carry out the statute's requirements. 1 16
The agency's goal of providing only guidance, and not actual regula-
tion, means that the regulations themselves contain little substance.
As demonstrated above, most of the regulations simply restate the
language of the Act with a few clarifications. The agency is admit-
tedly engaged in the project of not regulating.
Therefore, the negotiated rulemaking process that sought the in-
put of the teachers, students, states, and local school boards amounts
to nothing of substance. After meeting with the various interest
groups, the agency adopts only exactly what it was given by Congress.
The key problem with the DOE's position is that the statutory lan-
guage is clearly the work of Congress, while the regulations now have
the gloss of stakeholder consensus due to the participation of the in-
terest groups. The next Part of this Article demonstrates how the use
of negotiated rulemaking in the NCLB nonregulatory environment
distorts the original purpose of negotiated rulemaking.
III. THE GOALS AND PURPOSES OF
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
A. Harter's Negotiated Rulemaking
In 1982, Phillip Harter published the first article advocating the
use of negotiated rulemaking by federal agencies. 117 Harter described
a "malaise" in administrative law, especially surrounding the
rulemaking procedures."18 Harter argued that the malaise surround-
116. Id. at 50,896; Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged, 67
Fed. Reg. 30,452 (proposed May 6, 2002) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 200).
117. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1
(1982); see also William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regula-
tory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351
(1997) (noting that Harter provided the first real description of negotiated
rulemaking).
118. Harter, supra note 117, at 2; see also ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LESTER B. LAVE,
THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 3 (1981) (stating that
standards are created using incomplete evidence); PAUL W. MAcAvOY, THE REGU-
LATED INDUSTRIES AND THE ECONOMY 107 (1979) (discussing constraints placed on
agency decisionmaking by the use of previous business activities as a basis for
price regulation); Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New
Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1556 (1980) (stating that
administrative procedures lead to the adoption of policies without a sufficient
amount of consideration); David Ginsburg, Improving the Administrative Pro-
cess-Time for a New APA?, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 287 (1980) (discussing the tedious
nature of formal APA rulemaking procedures); Cornelius M. Kerwin, Assessing
the Effects of Consensual Processes in Regulatory Programs: Methodological and
Policy Issues, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 401 (1983) (advocating the use of consensual
processes to overcome the rigidity of traditional rulemaking); Irving Kristol, A
Regulated Society?, REG., July-Aug. 1977, at 12 (discussing the difficulties social
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ing agency rulemaking was created due to the adversarial nature of
the procedure, and that parties continually complained about the
time, expense, and legitimacy of the rulemaking process.11 9 Under
the traditional "notice and comment" informal rulemaking as de-
scribed in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the agency would
make the initial determinations about policy and develop a proposed
rule based on the expertise of the agency staff.120
and economic issues bring to effective regulation); Carl McGowan, The Adminis-
trative Conference: Guardian and Guide of the Regulatory Process, 53 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 67 (1985) (commenting on the rulemaking process); Thomas D. Morgan,
Toward a Revised Strategy for Ratemaking, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 21, 22 & n.6 (1978)
(discussing parties' complaints of delays in regulatory processes); Richard M.
Neustadt, The Administration's Regulatory Reform Program: An Overview, 32
ADMIN. L. REV. 129 (1980) (APA rulemaking process is cumbersome); William
Warfield Ross et al., Introductory Remarks, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 123 (1980) (dis-
cussing possible reforms in administrative process); Barbara J. Safriet, Judicial
Review of Government Action: Procedural Quandaries and Plea for Legislative
Reform, 15 ENVTL. L. 217 (1985) (calling for a rationale approach to judicially
review state agency action); Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the
Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Excep-
tions Process, 1984 DuKE L.J. 163 (discussing conflict between regulatory
processes and equity, particularly in regard to petroleum price regulation, and
suggesting an exceptions process to achieve regulatory equity); Martin Shapiro,
Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487 (1983) (discussing
the need for changes in judicial review of informal administrative action); Rich-
ard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual
Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1341-54 (1981) (proposing negotiated
rulemaking as an alternative to the timely and costly formal rulemaking pro-
cess); Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative
Procedure, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1805 (1978) (criticizing Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), for
limiting the ability of agencies to create formalities beyond the limited scope of
the APA's outdated rulemaking procedures); Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Con-
cept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 312-13 (1978) (discuss-
ing critics' views that the APA's rulemaking procedures are too rigid); Stephen F.
Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401 (1975) (describing alternative
rulemaking procedures outside informal rulemaking); Joel Yellin, High Technol-
ogy and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94
HARv. L. REV. 489, 505-09, 529-31, 546-49 (1981) (criticizing the adversarial na-
ture of the APA rulemaking process); Alexander Dill, Comment, Scope of Review
of Rulemaking After Chadha: A Case for the Delegation Doctrine?, 33 EMORY L.J.
953 (1984) (criticizing the confusing approach to judicial review of rulemaking);
Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to Traditional
Rulemaking, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1871 (1981) (discussing the benefits of using nego-
tiation to relieve some of the concerns presented by traditional rulemaking).
119. See Harter, supra note 117, at 6.
120. Id. at 9 (stating that the APA "was clearly built on the notion of agency exper-
tise"). The Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed to agency expertise as a reason
for courts to be deferential to the agency when reviewing an agency's decision to
adopt a regulation. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see generally Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) ("A court's prior judicial construction of a
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statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference
only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unam-
biguous terms of the Act and thus leaves no room for agency discretion."); Barn-
hart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) ("In this case, the interstitial nature of
the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the
question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration,
and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long pe-
riod of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through
which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue."); Shalala v.
Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 20 (2000) ("The Secretary's regu-
lations make clear that she so interprets the statute. The statute's language,
though not free of ambiguity, bears that interpretation." (citations omitted));
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 390 (1999) ("Particularly in
light of the fact that the agency utilized the notice-and-comment rulemaking pro-
cess before issuing the regulations, the argument that they were not intended to
be entitled to judicial deference implies a sufficient departure from conventional
contemporary administrative practice that we ought not to adopt it absent a dif-
ferent statutory structure and more express language to this effect in the regula-
tions themselves."); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999)
("Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a statute
will be resolved by the implementing agency .... We can only enforce the clear
limits that the 1996 Act contains . . . ."); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415,
423-425 (1999) (noting that the court of appeals failed to apply the appropriate
level of deference to the attorney general and Board of Immigration Appeal's
opinions); Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Dep't of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 98-99
(1999) (discussing why judicial deference to the agency decision is appropriate);
Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 389 (1998) ("Since the term
,reserve strengthening' is ambiguous, the task that confronts us is to decide, not
whether the Treasury regulation represents the best interpretation of the stat-
ute, but whether it represents a reasonable one."); Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522
U.S. 448, 450 (1998) ("If the agency's reading fills a gap or defines a term in a
reasonable way in light of the Legislature's design, we give that reading control-
ling weight, even if it is not the answer 'the court would have reached if the ques-
tion initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.'" (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843 n.l)); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997) (finding the SEC
did not violate its rulemaking authority); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517
U.S. 735, 739 (1996) ("It is our practice to defer to the reasonable judgments of
agencies with regard to the meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes that they are
charged with administering."); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 409
(1996) ("For the Board to prevail, it need not show that its construction is the best
way to read the statute; rather, courts must respect the Board's judgment so long
as its reading is a reasonable one."); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for
a Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) ("When Congress has entrusted the Secre-
tary with broad discretion, we are especially reluctant to substitute our views of
wise policy for his."); ICC v. Transcon Lines, 513 U.S. 138, 145 (1995) ("Although
the ICC's authority to determine proper remedies for violations under the Act is
not without limits, its judgment that a particular remedy is an appropriate exer-
cise of its enforcement authority ... is entitled to some deference."); PUD No. 1 of
Jefferson City. v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 712 (1994) ("EPA's con-
clusion that activities-not merely discharges-must comply with state water
quality standards is a reasonable interpretation of § 401, and is entitled to defer-
ence."); ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1994) ("When
Congress expressly delegates to an administrative agency the authority to make
specific policy determinations, courts must give the agency's decision controlling
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Harter proposed a form of negotiation as an alternative to the
traditional notice and comment rulemaking procedure. 12 1 Harter ar-
gued that parties having direct participation through negotiations
with the agency is preferable to entrusting the major policy decisions
weight unless it is 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.'"
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844)); Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S.
402, 417 (1993) ("[Wlhere the agency's interpretation of a statute is at least as
plausible as competing ones, there is little, if any, reason not to defer to its con-
struction."); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417
(1992) ("Judicial deference to reasonable interpretations by an agency of a statute
that it administers is a dominant, well-settled principle of federal law."); Am.
Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991) ("[E]ven if a statutory scheme
requires individualized determinations, the decisionmaker has the authority to
rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability unless Con-
gress clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority."); Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 128 (1991) (finding Interstate
Commerce Commission's regulation valid because the relevant statute is worded
in broad language); Fort Stewart Sch. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S.
641, 644-45 (1990) ("In construing these provisions, and the other provisions of
the FSLMRS at issue in this case, the Authority was interpreting the statute that
it is charged with implementing. We must therefore review its conclusions under
the standard set forth in [Chevron]." (citations omitted)); Dep't of the Treasury v.
Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 928 (1990) ("We must accept that con-
struction if it is a reasonable one, even though it is not the one we ourselves
would arrive at."); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 89 (1990) (stating that if a
statute is silent or ambiguous to an issue, then the court is limited to only deter-
mining whether or not the agency's interpretation is rational); Sullivan v. Zebley,
493 U.S. 521, 541 (1990) (regulations given by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services could not be reconciled with the Act); Massachusetts v. Morash,
490 U.S. 107, 116 (1989) (Secretary of Labor's decisions are entitled to deference);
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 292 (1988) ("If the agency regulation
is not in conflict with the plain language of the statute, a reviewing court must
give deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute."); Atkins v. Rivera,
477 U.S. 154, 162 (1986) ("Because the Secretary's regulation appears supported
by the plain language of the statute and is adopted pursuant to the explicit grant
of rulemaking authority in § 1396a(a)(17), it is 'entitled to more than mere defer-
ence or weight.'" (quoting Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981)));
United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 666 (1986) ("We must uphold that
interpretation if the statute yields up no definitive contrary legislative command
and if the agencies' approach is a reasonable one."); United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) ("An agency's construction of a
statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and
not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress."); Aluminum Co. of Am. v.
Cent. Lincoln Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984) (discussing the importance of
giving deference to an administrator's decision); United States v. Shimer, 367
U.S. 374 (1961) ("'[Wlhere Congress has committed to the head of a department
certain duties requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his action
thereon, whether it involve questions of law or fact, will not be reviewed by the
courts unless he has exceeded his authority or this court should be of opinion that
his action was clearly wrong." (quoting Bates & Guild v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106,
108-09 (1904))).
121. Harter, supra note 117, at 7.
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to the agency.1 22 Harter reasoned that a regulation negotiated be-
tween the interested parties and the agencies would have the support
of the various interests and the political legitimacy that many rules
lacked.123 Harter characterized the traditional APA rulemaking as an
adversarial process in which the agency makes the initial policy deci-
sion, and then is forced to defend its position after it receives addi-
tional information from the interested parties. 124
Harter further contrasts negotiated rulemaking with traditional
APA informal or hybrid rulemaking. Under APA rulemaking, the par-
ticipation of interested parties is limited to presenting facts and argu-
ments to the agency in order for the agency to develop a record that
establishes the factual basis for its rule.12 5
Harter presents the major justifications for adopting negotiation as
a model for agency rulemaking. First, negotiated rulemaking will
lend political legitimacy to an agency rulemaking system that has lost
legitimacy. 126 Traditional APA rulemaking attempts to garner legiti-
macy by relying on agency expertise, whereas negotiated rulemaking
derives its legitimacy from interested parties and the agency reaching
a consensus as to the proposed rule. 12 7
Second, interested parties in a negotiated rulemaking participate
directly in the decisionmaking.128 The parties are closely involved in
developing the regulation, instead of simply submitting information to
the agency and the agency deciding how to use the information. 129
Harter gives the example of a dam project where the agency talked to
the developers and environmental groups involved and reached a com-
promise before beginning the official administrative process. Harter
argues that involving the interested parties in the decisionmaking is
also less expensive than the adversarial model of APA rulemaking be-
cause it allows the agency to avoid the need to develop defensive re-
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 18-22 (describing the adversarial nature of APA rulemaking).
125. Id. at 16. The Supreme Court and appellate courts would review agency deci-
sions to insure that the agency had a factual basis underlying the adopted regula-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240,
252-53 (2d Cir. 1977) (criticizing the FDA for failing to explain its review and use
of scientific studies presented to the agency during the rulemaking procedure);
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
126. See Harter, supra note 117, at 18.
127. See id. at 17 ("Agency actions no longer gain acceptance from the presumed ex-
pertise of its staff. It is no longer viewed as legitimate simply because it fills in
the gaps left by Congress, or because it is guided by widely accepted public philos-
ophy. To the extent that rulemaking has political legitimacy, it derives from the
right of affected interests to present facts and arguments . . .
128. Id. at 28.
129. Id.
20071 1039
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
search to counter information submitted by a party in response to a
proposed rule.130
Third, Harter predicts that negotiated rulemaking will allow par-
ties to focus on their real interests and rank their concerns in order to
make trades in the negotiating process. 13 1 In APA rulemaking, a
party will often take an extreme position, like seeking to overturn an
entire regulation, when the party's real interest is to modify a few as-
pects of regulation.132 In the APA adversarial model, this type of
small disagreement may lead to protracted litigation, while in the ne-
gotiation model, parties are able to express their real concerns and
have them specifically addressed.
One of Harter's key justifications is that negotiated rulemaking is
more efficient than traditional APA rulemaking. "Rulemaking by ne-
gotiation can reduce the time and cost of developing regulations by
emphasizing practical and empirical concerns rather than theoretical
predictions." 13 3 Negotiation allows the parties to jointly decide what
information is necessary to make an informed decision. This is in con-
trast to traditional APA rulemaking pursuant to which all the parties
and the agency collect their own evidence in order to have information
available for the adversarial process. 13 4 Negotiated rulemaking al-
lows the parties and agencies to pool their resources and spend time
focusing on the details of the regulation.135
Finally, Harter theorized that the added legitimacy created
through negotiation would decrease litigation. "Overarching all the
other benefits of negotiation is the added legitimacy a rule would ac-
quire if all parties viewed the rule as reasonable and endorsed it with-
out a fight."136 Harter believed that many of the disputes settled in
courtrooms in the world of APA rulemaking would be discussed and
compromised among the parties during the negotiation.
B. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990
Many of Harter's prescriptions outlined in his groundbreaking ar-
ticle became law when negotiated rulemaking was officially sanc-
tioned by Congress in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act (NRA) of 1990
130. Id.
131. Id. at 29.
132. Id. Harter gives an example of an environmental group suing the EPA for grant-
ing a permit for a uranium mine, when the environmental group felt the environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) was insufficient. After the lawsuit was filed, the
parties entered into negotiations and the environmental group admitted that its
goal was a more extensive EIS, not to completely block the mine permit.
133. Id. at 30.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 31.
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and permanently reauthorized in 1996.137 Negotiated rulemaking is a
supplement for the notice-and-comment informal rulemaking under
the APA. When an agency engages in negotiated rulemaking, the
agency meets with representatives of interested parties prior to issu-
ing a proposed rule. The interested parties may include the regulated
industry, community citizen groups, and trade associations. The
agency tries to reach a consensus with the representatives. 138
Under the NRA, agencies are not required to engage in negotiated
rulemaking. Prior to beginning a rulemaking, the agency should as-
sess whether a negotiated rulemaking would be appropriate. This in-
cludes considerations about the number of identifiable interests and
the likelihood that the parties will negotiate in good faith.139
Once the agency decides to undertake a negotiated rulemaking
process, there is a notice in the Federal Register to seek representa-
tives from interested parties and give notice that the process will be a
negotiated rulemaking. If the group reaches a consensus on a rule,
the proposed rule is then published in the Federal Register and the
remaining steps of the notice and comment procedure are
undertaken.140
C. Critiques of Negotiated Rulemaking
After the adoption of the NRA following Harter's seminal article,
most of the literature on negotiated rulemaking praised its out-
comes.14 1 More recently, the academic literature reflects significant
critiques of negotiated rulemaking. There are a number of case stud-
ies evaluating negotiated rulemaking involving the Environmental
137. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Ne-
gotiated Rulemaking, 46 DuKE L.J. 1255 (1997).
138. Id. at 1256-57.
139. Id. at 1267. One of Hatter's concerns in his negotiated rulemaking proposal was
that negotiated rulemaking would be used in situations where it was inappropri-
ate. "Negotiation must be carefully analyzed to determine not only whether it
can work at all in the regulatory context, but also to identify those situations in
which it is appropriate." Harter, supra note 117, at 31.
Hatter identified many criteria for determining whether negotiated rulemak-
ing would produce a sound regulation or facilitate the rulemaking process. Id. at
41. First, various interests must have sufficient power so that no single party
may achieve its goal without negotiating with the others. Second, there must be
a limited number of identifiable parties to participate in the negotiation. Next,
the issues to be negotiated must be mature or "ripe" for determination. Fourth,
the parties need to be assured that regulation is imminent and inevitable to per-
suade them that they will benefit from expending the resources necessary to ne-
gotiate. Fifth, there must be some opportunity for both sides to win, meaning
zero-sum games are not ideal for negotiation. Id. at 45-52.
140. Coglianese, supra note 137, at 1267.
141. See Funk, supra note 117, at 1353 (stating that the academic literature on negoti-
ated rulemaking has largely extolled the virtues of the procedure).
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Protection Agency (EPA) because the EPA has undertaken and com-
pleted the most negotiated rulemakings of any federal agency. 14 2
In recent years, commentators such as Cary Coglianese have fo-
cused on two primary justifications for negotiated rulemaking: effi-
ciency and reduction of litigation. In one of the only comprehensive
empirical studies of negotiated rulemaking, Coglianese concludes that
the overall proportion of negotiated rulemakings is still relatively
small, at one-tenth of one percent of all agency rulemakings. There
were sixty-seven negotiated rulemakings undertaken by the end of
1996, thirteen abandoned, and nineteen remained pending. By 1997,
only thirty-five rules promulgated using negotiated rulemaking proce-
dure remained.143
William Funk argues that negotiated rulemaking conflicts with the
goals and theories of the APA and the administrative agency sys-
tem. 144 Funk states that the goal of agencies is to carry out the law as
written by Congress.145 Negotiated rulemaking makes the law
"merely a limitation on the range of bargaining [amongst the par-
ties]."146 The parties involved in a negotiated rulemaking seek to
serve their private interests, and a bargain is struck between the pri-
vate interests and the agency within the limits that the law provides.
Funk further contends that the role of the agency is to be a respon-
sible actor, and contrary to this role, negotiated rulemaking reduces
the agency to a participant.147 The agency should not become a medi-
ator or brokering service. 14 8 Instead, the agency's ultimate responsi-
bility is to achieve statutory goals. Funk argues that in negotiated
rulemaking, the agency is reduced "to the level of a mere participant
in the formulation of the rule and [negotiated rulemaking] essentially
142. See Coglianese, supra note 137, at 1273.
143. See id. at 1274. According to Coglianese the average negotiated rulemaking
takes a little less than two and a half years to complete from the time intent to
engage in negotiated rulemaking is announced until the final rule is published.
Id. at 1279. Coglianese also found that there is no considerable time savings over
the traditional informal rulemaking process, although negotiated rulemaking de-
mands more concentrated amounts of time. Also, there has been litigation after
some notable negotiated rulemakings including the EPA's visibility rule for the
Grand Canyon and the EPA's reformulated gasoline rule. Coglianese says from
1987 through 1991, twenty-six percent of EPA rules were challenged. At least six
of the EPA's twelve negotiated rules were challenged. Id. at 1301.
144. See Funk, supra note 117, at 1374.
145. Id.
146. Id. See also William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotia-
tion and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 67
(1987) (describing how in an EPA negotiated rulemaking the process led the
agency to deviate from the law).
147. Funk, supra note 117, at 1375.
148. Id. at 1376.
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denies the agency any responsibility beyond effectuating the consen-
sus achieved by the group."1 4 9
Funk also asserts that the agency is required to exercise instru-
mental rationality.15 0 An agency is required to design solutions to the
problems posed by the Act.151 The agency should gather data, views,
arguments, and other relevant material to come to a rational deci-
sion.15 2 Negotiated rulemaking undermines the search for rationality
by putting the emphasis on coming to a consensus instead of reaching
the best solution.153
Funk also maintains that the agency should do what is in the pub-
lic's best interest according to the law and the information the agency
gathers.154 When the agency acts in the public interest, it establishes
and maintains its legitimacy. Negotiated rulemaking undermines
this principle because it allows the agency's legitimacy to flow from
the participation of parties and consensus building instead of the
agency's ability to act in the public interest. 155
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1379.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1380.
153. See id. at 1382 (claiming that in one negotiated rulemaking the EPA used its data
and analysis as chips in the bargaining process instead of tools to reach a rea-
soned decision).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1386. Funk also describes two schools of thought that derive from the
study of legislative and administrative process. Public-choice theory is the idea
that regulation is inefficient because legislators and bureaucrats act in their own
self-interest, and in accordance with any special interest that will help them
achieve their goal. Id. at 1383. Interest-representation theory says there is no
general public interest or welfare to guide administrative decisionmaking.
Groups should attempt to influence agency participation by organizing and as-
serting themselves in the administrative process. Id. at 1384. See Jody Freeman,
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 561-62 (2000)
(providing a comparison of the public-choice theory and interest-representation
theory). But see id. at 567-71 (presenting a critique of the public-choice theory
and the unavoidable flaws inherent in implementing such a system). See gener-
ally id. at 559-60 (explaining the effect the interest-representation theory has on
administrative law); Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Ra-
tionality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 210-12 (1984) (providing a summary of the inter-
est-representation theory and an overview of the reasons and motivations behind
adopting such a theory in policymaking); Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Pub-
lic Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355, 355-82 (1999) (discussing the impact 'public
choice' has on the judiciary and litigation); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1760-802 (1975)
(describing the interest representation model and how it affects administrative
law); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN.
L. REV. 567 (1992) (describing the "interest representation" period and the "neo-
classical revival").
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NCLB requires extensive cooperation from federal, state, and local
officials.156 The Act also has a significant impact on local school
boards, teachers, parents, and children.157 NCLB presents the type of
scenario described by Harter in which the agency's work in rulemak-
ing may be assisted by interacting with interests groups and attempt-
ing to pool resources. 158 Under Harter's vision of negotiated
rulemaking, the NCLB interest groups would pool information and
ideas in order to reach the best policy choice.159
At the same time, unlike the NRA, there is no gateway procedure
for negotiated rulemaking under NCLB.160 Whenever the DOE un-
dertakes regulation under Title I of the Act, it must use the negotia-
tion process. 16 1 This means that negotiation may be used in
situations in which it may not be most efficient.
Finally, the critiques of negotiated rulemaking represented by
Funk's arguments resonate in the NCLB environment. 162 Is the DOE
seeking the benefits and legitimacy that derive from an appearance of
consensus amongst the affected interest groups to the detriment of the
public interest? Is data and other relevant information being used
only as a bargaining tool instead of a means to reach a rational resolu-
tion? The next Part explores the implications of the use of negotiated
rulemaking under NCLB.
IV. CONNECTING THE SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL FAILINGS OF NCLB
The previous Parts have presented a substantive and procedural
overview of NCLB. This Part makes the connection between the sub-
stantive critiques of the Act and the DOE's administration of the Act.
I argue that the misuse of the negotiated rulemaking process is actu-
ally magnifying the substantive shortcomings of the Act.
In order to demonstrate the integral role that administrative pro-
cedure has in the functioning of NCLB, this Article focuses on legisla-
tive history. Why did Congress require that all regulations under
Title I of the Act be the product of the negotiated rulemaking process?
The statutory language and legislative history demonstrate several
reasons.
First, the inclusion of negotiated rulemaking appears to be an ac-
knowledgement by Congress that NCLB is a complicated statutory
scheme that will affect numerous groups of stakeholders. The Act
156. See supra Part I.
157. See supra section I.B.
158. See supra section III.A.
159. See supra section III.A.
160. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
162. See supra section III.C.
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states that at the outset of the negotiated rulemaking process, the
agency should obtain "the advice and recommendations of representa-
tives of Federal, State, and local administrators, parents, teachers,
paraprofessionals, and members of local school boards."163
Also, Congress appears to be concerned with the Act's legitimacy in
the eyes of the key stakeholders. The Act specifically mentions that
representatives of parents and students should be included in the
rulemaking process. The DOE is required to "provide an equitable
balance between representatives of parents and students and repre-
sentatives of educators and education officials" on the negotiated
rulemaking committee. 164
Beyond the plain language of the Act, its legislative history pro-
vides further support for the view that Congress's intent was to get
input from various stakeholder groups that will be affected by
NCLB.165 The conference report outlines the intended balance among
representatives of parents, school officials, and others on the negoti-
ated rulemaking committee:
The Conferees intend that the Secretary select individuals to participate in
the Title I negotiated rulemaking in numbers that will provide an equitable
balance between representatives of parents and students and representatives
of educators and education officials. The Conferees do not intend this lan-
guage to require strict numerical equality or comparability among these rep-
resentatives. Rather, the Conferees intend the Secretary to have flexibility in
selecting the Conferees, while ensuring that the views of both program benefi-
ciaries and program providers are fairly heard and considered. 166
The legislative history of NCLB further emphasizes the need for
participation by certain groups of parents and students:
[Specifically], parents or other representatives of migrant children, homeless
children, and limited English proficient children be included among "parents"
and that civil rights groups, test publishers, participating private schools, and
faith-based organizations with educational expertise [should] be included
among the "other organizations involved with the implementation and opera-
tion of programs under this title."1 6 7
A. The DOE Fails to Comply with Negotiated Rulemaking
Requirements Under NCLB
Despite clear congressional intent that negotiated rulemaking be
used to gather information from stakeholders and gain legitimacy for
NCLB, the DOE has failed to properly administer the Act. First, the
DOE has failed to comply with the negotiated rulemaking portions of
163. 20 U.S.C. § 6571 (Supp. III 2003).
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845-49 (1991) (defending the use of legislative
history to interpret statutory language).
166. H.R. REP. No. 107-334, at 809 (2001) (emphasis added).
167. Id.
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NCLB. Specifically, the DOE has intentionally created negotiated
rulemaking committees that inadequately represent the interests of
parents and students.
The DOE selected twenty-two people to participate in the negoti-
ated rulemaking committee that created the first NCLB regula-
tions.168 This included six representatives for state administrators
and state boards of education, four representatives of local adminis-
trators and school boards, four representatives of principals and
teachers, seven representatives of students, and one representative of
business interests.169 Of the seven "student representatives," five
were also employees of a school system or state DOE.170
As noted above, the Act clearly states that while equal representa-
tion of all groups (administrators, parents, students) is not required,
the DOE should achieve an "equitable balance between representa-
tives of parents and students and representatives of educators and ed-
ucation officials" to insure "that the views of both program
beneficiaries and program providers are fairly heard and consid-
ered."1V1 The DOE failed to follow this statutory directive. Five of the
seven representatives for students or "program beneficiaries" were ac-
tually "program providers," such as employees of school districts.172
This lack of representation for program beneficiaries likely meant that
their views were not expressed independently from the goals of the
program providers.
NCLB's requirement of "equitable balance" indicates that Congress
was of the opinion that the views and goals of program beneficiaries
and program providers might differ.173 That is not a surprising con-
clusion considering that NCLB places significant burdens on the re-
sources that affect school districts, school administrators, and
teachers.174 The failure of the DOE to appoint to the negotiated
rulemaking process independent representatives for program benefi-
ciaries is a significant failure in implementation of the Act.
There is evidence from this first negotiated rulemaking that the
DOE intentionally created an inequitable balance on the rulemaking
168. Meeting Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 9223, 9224 (Feb. 28, 2002).
169. Id.
170. Id. The representatives for the students were Tasha Tillman, a parent from Colo-
rado Springs, Colorado; Minnie Pearce, a parent from Detroit, Michigan; Arturo
Abarca, a teacher from an elementary school in Los Angeles, California; Maria
Seidner, the Director of Bilingual Education for the Texas Education Agency; Dr.
Alexa Pochowski, Associate Commissioner, Kansas DOE; Myrna Toney, Director
of Migrant Education, Wisconsin DOE; and John R. Clark, Assistant Superinten-
dent for the DOE of the Diocese of Allentown, Pennsylvania.
171. H.R. REP. No. 107-334, at 809 (emphasis added).
172. See Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1154-55 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
173. See 20 U.S.C. § 6571 (Supp. III 2003).
174. See infra subsection IV.A.1.
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committee. In a lawsuit against the DOE regarding the composition of
the rulemaking committee, the plaintiffs pointed to several important
pieces of evidence that demonstrate the agency's intention to exclude
representatives of parents and students who might disagree with the
agency's policy choices.1 75
In an e-mail regarding one of the two parents on the negotiated
rulemaking committee, the agency stated, "[N] ominee, Tasha Tillman,
sided with the other parent to include the civil rights groups at the
table .... On a couple of the other early votes, [Tillman] is also siding
with the other parent group. Obviously not as reliable as we thought,
still early ... ,"176
The plaintiffs in the lawsuit also pointed to a notice in the Federal
Register seeking members for the negotiated rulemaking committee.
The agency listed several criteria that the agency would use in select-
ing members of the committee. The first criterion stated that mem-
bers of the committee should be practitioners "significantly involved
with implementing and operating Title I programs." 17 7
The DOE further signaled its intention to silence the representa-
tives of students and parents through the vigorous defense of this law-
suit challenging the negotiated rulemaking committee. In March
2002, a parent of two public school students and two advocacy groups,
Designs For Change and the Center for Law and Education, filed a
lawsuit in federal court to challenge the composition of a NCLB nego-
tiated rulemaking committee.178 The plaintiffs' lawsuit and immedi-
ate request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) was filed only two
months after NCLB was signed into law. 17 9 Thus, almost immedi-
ately, the negotiated rulemaking process itself led the DOE and NCLB
into litigation.
The plaintiffs sought a TRO to prevent the negotiated rulemaking
committee from convening.1 8 0 The request for a TRO was denied by
the district court due to lack of ripeness.181 The district court found
that the plaintiffs had to wait until the negotiated rulemaking com-
mittee concluded its work to proceed with the suit.1 8 2 Instead of at-
tempting to amicably resolve this dispute, the DOE refused to include
any of the plaintiffs on the committee. As discussed below, the DOE's
175. See Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 315 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2004).
176. Brief for Appellants at 14, Ctr. for Law & Educ., 396 F.3d 1152 (Nos. 02-5227 &
04-5150) (second ellipsis in original) (quoting an e-mail by a DOE employee from
March 11, 2002).
177. Id. at 10.
178. See Ctr. for Law & Educ., 396 F.3d at 1155.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
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refusal to avoid litigation undermines one of the fundamental policy
reasons for negotiated rulemaking.
In December 2002, the plaintiffs refiled their suit.'8 3 The plain-
tiffs argued that the DOE violated the negotiated rulemaking provi-
sions of NCLB by designating certain educators on the committee as
representatives for parents and children. The plaintiffs claimed that
the interests of parents and students were inadequately represented
on the rulemaking committee and that this was a violation of the pro-
cedural rights guaranteed under NCLB.1S4
The plaintiffs argued that the selection of the committee was un-
lawful under section 1901(b)(3)(B) of NCLB and "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."18 5
The DOE vigorously and successfully defended this lawsuit, seeking to
exclude the advocacy groups and parents from participating on the ne-
gotiated rulemaking committee. The district court granted the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to pursue their claims under Article III of the Constitution and that
the NRA bars judicial review of the DOE's selection of committee
members.' 8 6 The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district
court's determinations that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but refused
to reach the issue of whether the NRA bars judicial review.1 87
B. The Impact of Inequitable Balance on the DOE's Policy
Choices
The obvious question that looms large over the DOE's failure to
meet the equitable balance requirement in the Act is why the DOE
would intentionally exclude actual representatives of parent's and
children's interests, and what impact this exclusion had. The answer
lies at the heart of the negotiated rulemaking process itself. Negoti-
ated rulemaking requires that the committee reach a consensus on a
proposed rule before that rule is published for notice and comment.188
The existence of widely divergent views on the policy issue to be de-
cided in the rulemaking may signal to the agency that it will be diffi-
cult to build consensus. The agency has an incentive, therefore, to
exclude differing viewpoints.
It is useful to describe the different viewpoints that would emerge
amongst the groups designated to participate in a NCLB negotiated
183. Ctr. for Law & Educ., 315 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2004).
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966)).
186. Id. at 17-18.
187. Ctr. for Law & Educ., 396 F.3d at 1153 ("Moreover, because this Court concludes
that it lacks Article III jurisdiction over this case, it does not consider the alter-
nate issue of whether judicial review is barred by the Act.").
188. 5 U.S.C. § 566(f) (Supp. III 2003).
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rulemaking, including state school and local school administrators, lo-
cal school board representatives, teachers, parents, and students. The
interests of parents and students, the program beneficiaries, are likely
to converge. For example, in Center for Law & Education, the plaintiff
organizations are an example of the types of interest groups that
would likely be included in a negotiated rulemaking committee under
NCLB. Both plaintiff organizations had a long history of advocating
for parents and children in education, and a special interest in the
welfare of low income children.' 8 9 The two advocacy groups that filed
suit against the DOE were Designs for Change and the Center for Law
and Education.190 Both organizations are advocacy groups that "have
long records of promoting parental involvement in education and the
overall improvement of the educational system, especially on behalf of
low-income students."191
These plaintiff organizations representing NCLB program benefi-
ciaries had differing views on the policy choices to be made in the first
negotiated rulemaking. The agency put forth the point of view that, in
adopting assessment measures for students, the Act's requirement for
"multiple measures" required only the use of standardized tests.192
The plaintiff organizations interpreted "multiple measures" to mean
that student assessments should include factors other than standard-
ized testing.' 9 3
Beyond the plaintiff organizations in Center for Law & Education,
other organizations that represent the interests of parents and chil-
dren have indicated their fundamental disagreement with the Act and
the agency's adopted and proposed policy choices. The National
Center for Fair and Open Testing, an advocacy group for public school
parents and students, issued a report questioning the use of standard-
ized tests as the measure of student achievement. 194
Instead of appointing these types of parent and child representa-
tives who might fundamentally disagree with the agency's policy
choice, the DOE instead chose to appoint a teacher and local and state
education officials as the designated representatives for students. The
189. See Ctr. for Law & Educ., 396 F.3d at 1156.
190. Ctr. for Law & Educ., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 21.
193. Brief for Appellants at 33, Ctr. for Law & Educ., 396 F.3d 1152 (Nos. 02-5227 &
04-5150) (arguing that the DOE's failure to clarify the meaning of "multiple mea-
sures" under the Act may cause harm to students because of the increased risk
that students will be inaccurately assessed). See also MONTY NEILL ET AL., NAT'L
CTR. FOR FAIR & OPEN TESTING, FAILING OUR CHILDREN: How "No CHILD LEFT
BEHIND" UNDERMINES QUALITY AND EQUITY IN EDUCATION 3 (2004), available at
http://www.asu.edu/educ/epsl/EPRU/articlesEPRU-0405-62-OWI.pdf (arguing
that the DOE has misinterpreted and failed to enforce the "multiple measures"
provision of NCLB).
194. See NEILL ET AL., supra note 193, at 1-2.
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appointment of program providers to represent the interests of pro-
gram beneficiaries excludes unique views that may be held by the pro-
gram beneficiaries. In contrast to the views of parent and student
representatives, program providers have offered differing viewpoints
on policy choices.
The lawsuits filed by the State of Connecticut and the school
boards in Texas, Michigan, and other states indicate that the primary
focus of local and state school administrators is on adequate funding
for NCLB mandates and on burdens of administering the Act. 195 By
adopting a nonregulatory agenda, the DOE virtually insures that
state concerns regarding funding and administrative problems are not
debated in the negotiated rulemaking process. 19 6 Also, the lawsuits
themselves are an indication that the concerns of the states and state
education agencies are not being fully addressed in the negotiated
rulemaking process.
Exclusion of these groups is a choice by the DOE not to hear voices
of opposition in the negotiated rulemaking process. The advocacy
group plaintiffs indicated their strong opposition to another policy
choice at issue in the negotiated rulemaking process. The DOE and
the negotiated rulemaking committee agreed to propose a rule that
would permit a state to base its assessment system for students on
"either or both criterion-referenced assessments or nationally normed
assessment."19 7 The advocacy groups objected to the DOE's proposed
use of nationally normed assessments, which allow a student's profi-
ciency in a subject to be measured based on a comparison to other
student performance, instead of the mastery of specific skills or
knowledge. 198
The advocacy groups' policy leanings regarding norm-referenced
assessments would have posed a problem for the DOE in the consen-
sus building required under negotiated rulemaking. Negotiated
rulemaking requires that before a policy becomes a proposed rule, the
committee must reach a consensus, which is defined as "the lack of
active objection by any Committee member on all issues within a regu-
latory section."19 9 Thus, if the DOE had appointed either the Center
for Law and Education or Designs for Change to the committee, their
continued objection to norm-referenced assessments may have caused
the DOE to change its policy position to include norm-referenced as-
sessments as the primary method for states in the student assessment
process. Therefore, the failure to appoint the advocacy groups to the
negotiated rulemaking committee seems to be motivated by the DOE's
195. See supra note 55.
196. See supra Part II.
197. Ctr. for Law & Educ, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
198. Id. at 21 n.6.
199. Id. at 20 n.5.
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determination to push through its own set of predetermined policy
preferences. One of the benefits of negotiated rulemaking is to en-
courage the federal agency to seriously consider alternate viewpoints
on policy. In this case, the DOE used selection of the committee mem-
bers as a method of quieting adverse viewpoints.
Nick Lewin has made a persuasive argument that the DOE also
adopted flawed regulations related to the school-choice provisions of
NCLB. Lewin points out that the DOE adopted regulations that in-
struct school districts to follow the school-choice provision even when
it conflicts with a desegregation order that is already in place. 20 0
Lewin argues that this regulation flies in the face of congressional in-
tent because the Act does not direct school districts to ignore desegre-
gation orders. 2 0 1 He also contends that the regulation is bad policy
because it may make minority students more isolated than before,
when one of the stated goals of NCLB is to improve education for mi-
nority students. 20 2
Lewin's argument is another example of how a flawed negotiated
rulemaking process may exacerbate the substantive challenges to
NCLB. The school-choice/desegregation rule that Lewin discusses
was adopted in the first rulemaking in which there was inadequate
representation for parents and students.203 Arguably, representa-
tives of minority parents and children may have raised concerns about
the impact of the NCLB school-choice provision on desegregation
plans. Instead of adopting a regulation that is hostile towards deseg-
regation orders, the DOE would have been presented with viewpoints
that would have advocated a neutral or friendly position towards
maintaining desegregation plans.
The broad goal set forth by Congress in its passage of NCLB is to
benefit students, especially those in schools that are underperform-
ing.204 NCLB requires states to set standards for student perform-
ance, and for there to be consequences when schools fail to have
students meet those standards.205 These consequences promise to im-
200. Lewin, supra note 7, at 116. Title 34, section 200.44(c) of the Code of Federal
Regulations states:
(1) If an LEA is subject to a desegregation plan, whether that plan is
voluntary, court-ordered, or required by a Federal or State administra-
tive agency, the LEA is not exempt from [offering students the option to
transfer schools] ....
(3) If the desegregation plan forbids the LEA from offering the transfer
option ... the LEA must secure appropriate changes to the plan.
201. Id. at 117.
202. Id. at 120-21.
203. See id. at 116 (noting that the school-choice provision/desegregation regulation
was adopted in the first rulemaking concluded December 2, 2002).
204. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. III 2003).
205. See supra section I.A.
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pact students, parents, and educators. It is fair to say that students
will bear the burden of many of these choices. 20 6
C. The DOE's Conduct in NCLB Negotiated Rulemaking also
Violates General Negotiated Rulemaking Principles
Another question is whether the DOE's actions under NCLB are an
anomaly in the world of negotiated rulemaking. Do agencies always
attempt to stack the deck on the rulemaking committee by excluding
interest groups who disagree with the agency's initial policy positions?
A review of case law on negotiated rulemaking reveals that there have
been no other reported cases in which an interest group attempts to
challenge the composition of the rulemaking committee.
In the Center for Law & Education litigation, the plaintiffs com-
pared their argument to other litigants who have sought inclusion on
committees formed under the Federal Advisory Committee Act.2 07
The plaintiffs/appellants argued that under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, the selection of a committee is a final agency action
subject to judicial review.2 08
It seems that in negotiated rulemaking litigation conducted
against the EPA, OSHA, and FRA, the challenges have focused on the
substantive outcomes of the rulemakings. Specifically, whether the
final rule adopted by the agency after a negotiated rulemaking is an
arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the governing statute.2 0 9
The negotiated rulemaking by the DOE under NCLB was not the
agency's first negotiated rulemaking. Prior to the enactment of
NCLB, the DOE participated in at least six other negotiated rulemak-
ings. 2 10 In reported cases of these six negotiated rulemakings, one
206. See supra Part I. For example, in Kansas schools students who failed to pass
state assessments were required to double reading and math courses to improve
test scores. See Heather Hollingsworth, Students get Double Doses of Three R's,
KANSAS CITY STAR, June 29, 2006. In New York, thousands of elementary and
middle school students will not be promoted to the next grade due to failing test
scores. Andrew Wolf, An Uproar Erupts at State's Delay in Grading Exams, N.Y.
SuN, June 20, 2006, http://www.nysun.com/article/34697.
207. Reply Brief for Appellants at 22, Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 396 F.3d
1152 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 02-5227 & 04-5150).
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Steel Joist Inst. v. OSHA, 287 F.3d 1165, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (chal-
lenging safety standards for steel erection adopted by OSHA after a negotiated
rulemaking); Ass'n of Am. R.R. v. Dep't of Transp., 198 F.3d 944, 946 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (challenging a Federal Railroad Administration technical bulletin that was
issued after a negotiated rulemaking). Cary Coglianese found that as of 1996, six
of the EPA's twelve finalized rules developed during negotiated rulemaking were
subject to petitions for judicial review filed in federal court. All of these chal-
lenges were to the substance of the final rule. Coglianese, supra note 137, at
1301.
210. See Coglianese, supra note 9, at 393 n.29.
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negotiated rulemaking was challenged. Congress required the DOE to
initiate a negotiated rulemaking to develop regulations to implement
the 1992 amendments to the Higher Education Act.211 There were
several challenges to the final rule, including when the new regula-
tions began to apply and the scope of authority for the Secretary of
Education to impose broad duties on student loan servicers. 2 12
The only procedural challenge found in the reported cases to a
DOE negotiated rulemaking was to the procedures used by the DOE
in the negotiated rulemaking for the 1992 amendments to the Higher
Education Act. Student loan service providers argued that the DOE
negotiated in bad faith.213 The service providers claimed that during
the negotiation process, the DOE promised to abide by the consensus
reached by the committee unless there was a compelling reason to de-
part.2 14 The Seventh Circuit held that although this promise was
made by an agency official, it was unenforceable and that the NRA did
not intend to make such promises enforceable. 215 The service provid-
ers did not challenge the composition of the rulemaking committee or
claim that the Higher Education Act itself demanded that the negoti-
ated rulemaking be conducted in a certain manner. The cases seem to
indicate that all of the interested parties were represented in this ne-
gotiated rulemaking, including loan service providers, educational in-
stitutions, and representatives of students as borrowers.
Thus, the DOE's refusal to include legitimate representatives of
parents and students on the negotiated rulemaking committee, as
clearly required under NCLB, appears to be a relatively novel proce-
dural defect in the agency's actions. It is important to recognize that
this attempt to stack the deck for NCLB negotiated rulemaking is not
a common negotiated rulemaking practice.
V. ADDRESSING THE DOE'S FAILURES IN
IMPLEMENTATION OF NCLB
It is almost certain that NCLB will continue to exist.2 16 The law is
up for renewal in 2007 and Congress appears committed to keeping
the Act in place. The obvious question is how to correct the substan-
tive and procedural shortcomings of the Act. As demonstrated in the
211. Career Coll. Assoc. v. Riley, 74 F,3d 1265, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
212. See id; USA Group Loan Serv., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 1996).
213. Riley, 82 F.3d at 714.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 715.
216. See Associated Press, Lawmakers Say 'No Child' Law Not Going Anywhere, CNN
ONLINE (May 19, 2006), available at http://civillibertarian.blogspot.com/2006/05/
lawmakers-say-no-child-law-not-going.html (noting that congressional hearings
have begun for the law's renewal, and legislators interested in improving the law
but not abolishing it).
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previous Parts, many of the substantive shortcomings of NCLB are
being enhanced by the DOE's failures in administration. Thus, this
Part will focus on how to use administrative procedure to enhance the
effectiveness of the Act as it is currently constructed.
It is especially important to focus on improving the DOE's adminis-
tration, because negotiated rulemaking has the potential to directly
address stakeholder concerns with the Act. 2 17 Many of the substan-
tive critiques of NCLB, such as overreliance on testing and the bur-
dens for minority children are areas where NCLB stakeholders have
expertise that may improve the Act. What aspects of the DOE's prac-
tice need to change to make negotiated rulemaking a statutory asset
instead of a liability?
First, the DOE's limited inclusion of representatives of parents and
students from the negotiated rulemaking process is a violation of
NCLB and the broader principles of negotiated rulemaking. There are
several steps that should be taken to address the DOE's failure in im-
plementation of the Act.
Congress should clarify the "equitable balance" language in NCLB.
Currently, the Act provides that the negotiated rulemaking committee
should have an equitable balance between representatives of parents
and students and representatives of educators and education offi-
cials. 2 18 The agency has interpreted this portion of the Act to allow
educators and education officials to act as representatives of parents
and children. 2 19 Congress should repudiate this interpretation with
statutory language clarifying that representatives of parent and stu-
dent interests should not be educators or education officials. While
the current statutory language is already clear on this point, Congress
must force the agency to adopt the proper interpretation of the statu-
tory language.
Furthermore, Congress should provide a remedy for parties that
believe they have been wrongfully excluded from the negotiated
rulemaking process. The statutory language is clear that the negoti-
217. The question of how stakeholders such as teachers, parents, and students fully
participate in education reform or in regulation more generally is a complex ques-
tion that I do not attempt to fully address in this Article. Some recent work by
legal scholars focuses on the role of private actors in public governance, and how
administrative agencies may best use the input of stakeholders. See, e.g., Free-
man, supra note 155, at 544-45 (providing a theoretical framework for private
actors to play a role in public governance as regulatory resources and sources of
accountability); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (proposing a model of collaborative governance
as an alternative to traditional regulatory reinvention such as constraining
agency discretion).
218. See supra Part II.
219. See Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 315 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 2004)
(noting that there were seven representatives for students and five of them were
state or local education officials and a teacher).
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ated rulemaking committee should include an equitable balance. 2 20
This directive has been ignored by the DOE, and through litigation,
the agency has fought greater inclusion of parent and student repre-
sentatives. 22 1 In Center for Law & Education, the DOE claimed both
that the representatives did not have standing and that NCLB pro-
vided no private right of action.22 2 The district court agreed that no
private right of action was included in the Act.2 23 Although the appel-
late court refused to reach this question, the outcome of the litigation
demonstrates that the Act, as currently written, will likely be inter-
preted by courts to provide no remedy for interested parties excluded
from the negotiated rulemaking process. 2 24
By including an explicit remedy to stakeholders to demand fair
constitution of the negotiated rulemaking committee, Congress would
provide incentive for the agency to fairly constitute the rulemaking
committee. The agency would be aware of potential litigation stem-
ming from the formation of the negotiated rulemaking committee and
would have an incentive to compromise with the stakeholders. The
agency's current position of attempting to limit participation of stake-
holders that may disagree with the agency's initial policy position
would be curtailed by the agency's interest in avoiding litigation.
Also, providing a remedy to stakeholders to address unfair consti-
tution of a negotiated rulemaking committee is a return to Harter's
original vision of negotiated rulemaking. 22 5 Negotiated rulemaking
was intended to limit litigation by bringing all the stakeholders to the
rulemaking process in order to encourage collaboration and consensus
in the rulemaking process. 22 6 The events surrounding the first
rulemaking under NCLB demonstrate that the agency's current inter-
pretation of the Act is encouraging litigation through the agency's re-
fusal to make a good-faith effort to use the negotiated rulemaking
process to build consensus. 22 7 Instead, the agency has simply at-
tempted to stack the deck in favor of their initial policy position. 2 28 A
private right of action would likely help ward off litigation by provid-
220. See supra Part IV.
221. See supra section W.A.
222. See Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(finding that CLE and the individual parent plaintiff lacked standing to chal-
lenge the composition of the negotiated rulemaking committee).
223. See Ctr. for Law & Educ., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 (finding that section 570 of
the NRA bars judicial review of a challenge to the establishment of an agency's
negotiated rulemaking committee).
224. On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit refused to reach the issue of the judi-
cial review bar. Ctr. for Law & Educ., 396 F.3d at 1156.
225. See supra section III.A.
226. See supra sections III.A-B.
227. See supra Part IV.
228. See supra section V.A.
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ing the agency with an incentive not to stack the deck in the agency's
favor.
Those scholars who question the success of negotiated rulemaking
in decreasing litigation point to legal challenges by participants in ne-
gotiated rulemaking after the adoption of the final substantive
rule.229 I suggest that Congress create two clear avenues for litiga-
tion: one at the formation of the rulemaking committee and another
after the final rule is adopted. 230 The potential for both a procedural
challenge to composition of the committee and a substantive challenge
to the rules themselves potentially creates twice the amount of litiga-
tion to develop from NCLB rulemaking. However, by clarifying the
statutory language regarding composition of the committee and pro-
viding a private right of action, the DOE will be forced to bring all
legitimate stakeholders into the negotiated rulemaking and to reach a
real consensus. By more faithfully following the negotiated rulemak-
ing principles, there will be less likelihood of challenges to the final
rules.
Also, critics of negotiated rulemaking, such as William Funk, ar-
gue that negotiated rulemaking undermines the rule of law and turns
regulation into bargaining among parties with the law serving only as
a limitation.231 In the case of NCLB, I would argue that the participa-
tion of the stakeholders is actually needed to fulfill the rule of law.
The law in itself requires meaningful participation by state and local
officials, and representatives of parents and students. 23 2 The DOE's
refusal to honor this statutory requirement undermines the entire
statutory scheme. Beyond the NCLB negotiated rulemaking require-
ments themselves, input of the stakeholders is vital to meeting
NCLB's stated purpose of improving education for all children. With-
out meaningful stakeholder input, NCLB is destined to become noth-
ing more than another level of bureaucracy with which educators
must comply.
Beyond fulfilling the equitable balance requirement of NCLB, im-
proving the administrative process will require the DOE to commit to
actually regulate. The DOE currently claims in its rulemaking pro-
cess that one of the goals of NCLB is to regulate as little as possi-
ble.2 3 3 This has led to states being left without sufficient guidance. 2 34
Also, the DOE is approaching many of the most difficult questions
229. See supra section III.C.
230. See, e.g., Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 315 F. Supp. 2d 15, 29-30 (D.D.C.
2004) (discussing the two phases of the plaintiffs' lawsuit against the DOE).
231. See Funk, supra note 117, at 1374.
232. See supra Part IV.
233. See supra Part II.
234. See supra note 55.
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under the Act on a case-by-case basis.235 This is a limited strategy for
creating policy.
NCLB is a complex act that requires cooperation from all fifty
states and the federal government. This statute comes into a highly
regulated environment of already existing state laws regarding stu-
dent achievement and testing. In the face of this regulatory challenge,
the DOE must take the lead and use the rulemaking process to pro-
vide useful gap filling.
VI. CONCLUSION
NCLB is a troubled statutory scheme. In order for it to succeed,
there must be significant participation by the NCLB stakeholders,
such as teachers, parents, and students. Congress has provided nego-
tiated rulemaking as a procedural mechanism to encourage stake-
holder participation. The DOE must honor this choice and use
negotiated rulemaking as a way to improve administration of the Act.
235. See GAIL SUNDERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, THE UNRAVELING OF No CHILD LEFT
BEHIND: How NEGOTIATED CHANGES TRANSFORM THE LAW (2006).
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